From Dr. Soeren Keil, Reader in Politics and International Relations. Since 2016, he has been travelling to Myanmar regularly as an expert for the German Hanns-Seidel Foundation to work with EAOs, political parties, civil society and the Union Civil Service Board on federalism and decentralisation.

Myanmar’s peace process is in a deadlock. What started with the signing of the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) in 2015 between the then military-backed government and eight ethnic armed groups (EAOs), has, more than three years later, not turned into the promised paths to sustainable peace, but a quagmire in which a way forward is seemingly hard to identify.

How did it come to this?

Post-2015, four rounds of the Panglong Conference for the 21^stCentury Peace took place in Naypyitaw, Myanmar’s capital. This peace conference brought together the government (since the end of 2015 the NLD-led administration with State Councillor Aung San Suu Kyi), the EAOs, military representatives (known as the Tatmadaw in Myanmar), as well as representatives from political parties and civil society, although these were not directly involved in decision-taking. At the beginning, this forum was praised for its variety and inclusivity of participants and ability to bring the different actors together, however after numerous meetings tensions became obvious. While federal principles had already been established as part of the NCA framework, these have not been further elaborated and there has been no concrete discussion on how to implement these in the country. Observers reported that the Tatmadaw representatives blocked discussions and decisions on major issues, in particularly regarding to constitutional changes and the move towards an inclusive federal system – a key demand of the EAOs. Likewise, EAOs and the NLD-government clashed on procedural issues and on questions related to minority protection. The EAOs’ demand to also include those ethnic armed groups that have not signed the NCA has been a constant issue in the negotiations. Further questions, such as over the meaning of self-determination, a non-secession clause, security sector reform, and even the name of the country have further created tensions and increased the hard-line positions amongst the different actors.

A Leadership Meeting was called in October 2018 to address the lack of progress of the Panglong for the 21^st Century Peace Conference, in which the Military Leadership, the State Councillor and the leaders of the EAOs were to discuss the way forward in the peace process. However, instead of fleshing out an agenda for the next steps, this meeting resulted in increased tensions when the Commander-in-Chief Min Aung Hlaing used his speech to attack EAOs and blame them for the lack of progress. The meeting was adjourned without results, however the Restoration Council for the Shan State (RCSS) made very clear its dissatisfaction with the meeting and threatened to end the peace process. The Karen National Union (KNU) went even further and suspended its membership in the peace process, although it has remained committed to the NCA. These two EAOs are particularly important, because they are seen as very significant groups in terms of men-under-arms, so their participation in the peace process has given it additional credibility and increased the prospect for peace across the country.

What is the way forward?

A number of observers in Myanmar and abroad have raised fears that the peace process might be failing, and that the current framework is doomed. There is, in my opinion, reason to be worried, but failure is not inevitable. What is needed is a complete rethink by the main actors involved.

The EAOs need to come together and formulate clear policy demands. Their ideas of a federal democratic union deserve support and recognition; however, they need to flesh out how this union might be achieved and what it would eventually look like. A roadmap for constitutional reform could be developed to identify which reforms can be implemented quickly to move towards a federal system, and which issues will need wider and more long-term consideration. It is also important that the signatories to the NCA work closely with the non-signatories so a common vision about the future federal state of Myanmar can emerge. What is more, in this time of heightened tensions particularly between Tatmadaw and EAOs leadership is of key importance. The NLD – through its government and parliament – need to act as the main driver of the constitutional roadmap, and the main bridge-builder between Tatmadaw and EAOs. The NLD electoral promise of moving the peace process forward can only become reality, if the NLD uses its public mandate (and involves parliament) to push the different actors towards compromises and important decisions.

The State Councillor used the high-level meeting in October to promote a stronger role for parliament, which was rejected by the Tatmadaw and the EAOs. While neither of these groups can be excluded from the peace process, giving the parliament a stronger role in the peace process is important. The 21^st Century Panglong Conference lacks democratic legitimacy, and parliament is the most democratic and legitimate body in Myanmar. Hence, thinking about innovative ways of strengthening the role of parliament as well as selected MPs that are already part of the peace process could considerably support the impact of the peace process in the wider political discourse in Myanmar. At the same time it is important for the government and in this respect, especially for the State Councillor to overcome their self-defined role as mediators between the Tatmadaw and the EAOs, and instead provide their own contribution into the peace process. Until today, the position of the NLD on federalism is vague and there are no position papers that detail either a path to a federal future, nor a vision that the party aims for. At present, the parliament is more or less lead by the government’s hands off approach and discussions and debates about the current peace process. Neither the peace process nor constitutional changes needed for a functional federal system are part of the parliamentary agenda.  Parliament will need to play a much stronger role in the future, and reforms to the administrative and bureaucratic bodies in the country could start immediately and set the tone for future decentralisation and implementation of a federal system.

Obviously no peace can be reached in Myanmar without the agreement of the Tatmadaw leadership. The Tatmadaw is a key stakeholder in parliament, where they hold 25% of the seats.  Furthermore, within government, three ministers (Border Affairs, Defence and Home Affairs) are appointed by the Commander-in-Chief, and the most important administrative institution, especially for the local administrative level, the General Administration Department (GAD) is situated within the Ministry of Home Affairs. The current peace process was initiated by the first civilian government (2011-2015), which had very strong Tatmadaw backing at the time.

It is at this point unclear where the Tatmadaw see the peace process heading towards. They are not willing to allow substantial debates, let alone the start of fundamental reforms to the political system that has been implemented by the 2008-military-backed constitution. Nevertheless, the Tatmadaw have to make important decisions, not least for their own future. Where do they see themselves in 10 years? What role should the military play in Myanmar in 2030? The current reform process was initiated by the previous military rulers, who voluntarily handed some political power to democratically elected elites. Will the Tatmadaw continue on this road? While many argue that the Tatmadaw have used the peace process to delay the transfer of power and strengthen their own influence, it is important for Commander-in-Chief Senior General Min Aung Hlaing and other senior officials in the Tatmadaw to consider the alternatives to the current peace process. So far, it has only become obvious that the Tatmadaw connect the current peace process with a wider reform of the security services in the country, especially their demand for demilitarisation of the EAOs and decommissioning of their weapons and fighters. The Tatmadaw also want to reform themselves, with the Senior General’s stated aim to create a modern and functional military in line with international standards. Both reform efforts are seen with suspicion by the EAOs particularly. They argue that they can only decommission their weapons and fighters, once peace has been established, and the Tatmadaw themselves have reformed to reflect the diversity of the country and have been put under civilian control.

This demonstrates the inter-connectedness of multiple issues within the peace process. Yet, in recent months, there has been a deadlock in all of these areas, and there is a real risk of the whole NCA framework failing. If this were the case, a return to violence cannot be excluded.

Making Myanmar’s peace process work is no easy feat. It requires commitment and a new focus of all actors. However, the alternative is renewed fighting and a return to war. The country has had this for over 60 years, and has benefitted no-one. This is why peace deserves another chance.